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Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace: A Test in the Developing World 
Faruk Ekmekci 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to test the capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the developing 
world. Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence which indicate two 
different dynamics of interstate conflict in the developing and the developed worlds, the 
proponents of both “democratic peace” and “capitalist peace” arguments did not take into 
account the distinction between developing and developed countries and tested their 
hypotheses within samples that included “all dyads” in different time periods. This study 
aims to fill this gap by testing capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the 
developing world. It tests the capitalist and democratic peace arguments through statistical 
analysis (logistic regression) of the militarized interstate disputes in the developing world 
between 1951 and 2000. The results support the “capitalist peace” argument and suggest that, 
within the developing world, economic development leads to interstate peace, whereas 
democracy does not. The findings are robust to different measures of conflict, democracy and 
economic development. 
 
Introduction 
“Democratic peace” has been one of the most extensively studied phenomena of 
international relations in the last three decades. The proponents of the democratic peace 
theory argued that democratic norms and institutions have rendered militarized conflicts 
among democratic countries unprecedentedly rare, if not obsolete. Yet the theory has been 
criticized on a variety of grounds as well. Two recent challenges to the democratic peace 
theory are the “capitalist peace” and “non-universality” arguments. The former argues that it 
is capitalism, rather than democracy, that accounts for the rarity of conflicts among 
contemporary democracies, while the latter contends that democracy’s peaceful effects on 
interstate relations are limited to Western Europe and North America.  
This article aims to make a simultaneous test of these two challenges to the 
democratic peace theory as well as the theory itself. It tests the capitalist and democratic 
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peace arguments through statistical analysis of the militarized interstate disputes in the 
developing world between 1951 and 2000. In the remainder of this paper, I first provide a 
brief summary of the literature on democratic and capitalist peace. Then, I make a case for 
the need for separate statistical analysis of interstate conflict in the developing world. 
Subsequently, using logistic regression, I test democratic and capitalist arguments for peace 
through analyzing the dyadic militarized interstate disputes of developing countries between 
1951 and 2000. Finally, I conclude with a summary of my findings and highlight their 
importance for future research. 
Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace      
Since Small and Singer (1976) reported that democracies have not fought each other 
in the modern era, numerous empirical studies have been published in influential political 
science journals to confirm this “democratic peace”. By mid 1990s, some proponents of the 
democratic peace had already awarded the phenomenon a “law-like status” (Levy, 1994, p. 
352). Even the critics of the democratic peace theory conceded that democratic peace has 
been the “preeminent nontrivial fact of international relations” (Mousseau, 2002, p. 137) and 
the democratic peace theory has been “probably the most powerful liberal contribution to the 
debate on the causes of war and peace” (Rosato, 2003, p. 585).  
The “Kantian liberals” have introduced two alternative explanations for the relative 
peace among democracies: one institutional and the other normative. The institutional 
account of the democratic peace argued that the institutional structure of democratic countries 
restrains them from waging costly wars, in particular against other democracies, thereby 
leading the decision-makers to settle their international disputes peacefully (Bueno de 
Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Lake, 1992; Russett, 1993). As Maoz and 
Russett explain it,  
due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a 
broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage 
wars, except in cases wherein war seems a necessity or when the war aims are seen 
as justifying the mobilization costs. (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 626) 
The normative account, on the other hand, argued that democratic countries perceive each 
other as friends sharing common values and norms, and this mutual perception results in the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts (Maoz & Russett, 1992, 1993; Owen, 1994). In Owen’s 
words, “once liberals accept a foreign state as a democracy, they adamantly oppose war 
against that state” (Owen, 1994, p. 95). 
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The democratic peace theory also had its dissidents since its inception and has been 
widely criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Realist, Marxist, and power-
transitionist scholars of international relations argued from different perspectives that it was 
convergence of interests and policy, rather than norms and institutions, which created a 
relative peace among Western democracies in the post-WWII era (see e.g. Barkawi & Laffey, 
1999; Farber & Gowa, 1995; Layne, 1994; Lemke & Reed, 1996; Oren, 1995; Rosato, 2003; 
Spiro, 1994). 
A recent challenge to the democratic peace theory is the argument that the correlation 
between democracy and peace is spurious and it is capitalism, rather than democracy, which 
has created a relative “zone of peace” among democratic countries (Gartzke & Hewitt, 2010; 
Gartzke, 2007; McDonald, 2010; Mousseau, 2009). According to the proponents of the 
capitalist peace theory, capitalism reduces the use of force in interstate relations by de-
emphasizing land and minerals (Gartzke, 2007), establishing contract-intensive economies 
(Mousseau, 2009), and reducing the state’s role in the economy (McDonald, 2010), thereby 
leading to “capitalist peace”. 
The “capitalist peace” argument currently suffers a weakness that the democratic 
peace argument suffered until recently, namely an unsubstantiated universality claim. Despite 
the presence of considerable empirical evidence which indicates that democracy’s (and 
several other variables’) effect on interstate conflict varies in developing and developed 
worlds (Goldsmith, 2006; Henderson, 2003, 2009; Mousseau, 2002), the proponents of the 
“capitalist peace” argument as well as the scholars who challenged them via statistical 
refutations (Choi, 2011; Dafoe, 2011) have not taken into account the distinction between 
developing and developed countries and tested their hypotheses within samples that included 
“all dyads” in different time periods. This article aims to fill this gap by testing capitalist and 
democratic peace arguments within the developing world. 
Studying Interstate Conflict in the Developing World 
The importance of context in international politics is well studied by scholars of 
International Relations (IR) (Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Goertz, 1994; Kacowicz, 1998). 
Contextual analysis of international relations refers to a study that takes into account the 
categorical differences between two or more “groups of states” and can be based on 
differences in region, history, regime-type, major-minor power status, economic 
development, and many others. The differences between the developed and developing states 
were one of the primary systematic differences that struck the critics of the mainstream IR 
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theories. Some (Bilgin & Morton, 2002; Jackson, 1993) have questioned the relevance of the 
very concept of “the state” to the developing world and argued that many third world states 
lack central features of a standard Western state, such as sovereignty, legitimacy, and self-
sustenance. Wallerstein (1974) contended that whereas the economic development of the 
Western countries and the increasing wealth and power of the bourgeoisie were accompanied 
by the construction of “strong” states, the dependent situation of the Third World countries 
and their openness and vulnerability to the manipulations of the core countries resulted in the 
creation of “weak” states. Somewhat as an elaboration on these arguments, some others 
argued that the “insecurity dilemma”, which derives from the internal “weakness” of the 
Third World countries, rather than the oft-argued security dilemma, shapes the security 
strategies of the Third World countries (Ayoob, 1995; Glenn, 1997; Job, 1992). There were 
also other scholars who problematized the “independence” of Third World states (Clapham, 
1999; Escude, 1998; Hey, 1995) and maintained that the economic and political dependence 
of the Third World countries to the developed world render the “hierarchical” nature of the 
international system more relevant to the foreign policy behavior of developing states than its 
“anarchical” structure. Neuman (1998) makes an interesting summary of these arguments:  
For many LDCs [less developed countries], then, the realist focus on a sharp 
boundary between domestic “order” and international “anarchy” may be 
applicable, but in reverse. It is the hierarchical structure of the world that provides 
them with an ordered reality, and a “condition of unsettled rules” that afflict them 
at home. (p. 3) 
In line with these theoretical concerns, some recent empirical research also suggested 
a categorical difference between certain regions of the world. Henderson (2003) and 
Goldsmith (2006) tested the regional contingency of the prominent democratic peace 
argument and found that democracy loses its conflict-dampening effect outside the developed 
West (Western Europe and North America). Similarly, other studies found democracy has no 
or miniscule peaceful effect in poor countries (Mousseau, 2000, 2002; Mousseau, Hegre, & 
Oneal, 2003). These empirical findings suggest that the purported categorical differences 
between the developed world and the developing world are not mere constructs of the minds 
of critical IR theorists.
 
 Thus, I believe that it is appropriate and necessary to make separate 
tests for the developing world if we are to gauge the effects of capitalism and democracy on 
international conflicts of developing countries.    
Empirical Analyses: Militarized Interstate Disputes in the Developing World 
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Methodology. 
This research aims to test the democratic and capitalist explanations of peace within 
the developing world by analyzing the dyadic conflict behavior of “developing states” only. 
Consequently, dyads with two “developed” countries will be excluded from my analysis. I 
analyze only dyads with two developing states and the ones that include a developing state 
and a developed one.  
Identifying “developed” countries entails some degree of arbitrariness, especially 
when we study a long time period rather than a single point in time. Some of the 35 countries 
that are currently identified a developed country by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
were not developed countries in large sections of this study’s time period and gained their 
“developed country” status towards the end of this period. Thus, I do not consider all current 
developed countries as a developed country in this study. Countries that have been identified 
as “developed” in this study are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries during the period I analyze except Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and 
Greece. I considered the latter countries “developing states” given their relatively lower 
Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita and industrialization levels before the 1990s. As a 
general rule, I considered a country a “developed country” if its GDP per capita was at least 
50 percent of the U.S. GDP per capita in more than half of the years between 1951 and 2000. 
Following the general practice, I did not consider oil-rich countries developed countries. 
Thus, the following countries are considered developed countries in this study: the US, 
Canada, Britain, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Switzerland, (West) Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
Andorra, Monaco, and Liechtenstein. Any dyad that includes two of these developed 
countries was excluded from my analysis. 
The temporal domain of this research is the period between 1951 and 2000. Rarity of 
“independent” states before 1950 as well as lack of reliable economic data for pre-1950 years 
resulted in the exclusion of earlier years from the sample. Also, because most developing 
states lack the capability to reach non-neighboring states, I analyzed contiguous dyads only in 
order to avoid possible estimation problems that might result from artificial inflation of the 
sample size with the inclusion of “irrelevant” cases. Two states are considered contiguous if 
they share a land border or are separated by less than 150 miles of water. 
The Dependent Variable. 
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The dependent variable of this study is the occurrence of a militarized interstate dispute 
(MID) in a given dyad-year. Following Russett and Oneal (2001) and many others, onset and 
continuation of MIDs are treated the same. A MID is defined as an event where the 
government or citizens of at least one state threatened, displayed, or used forced against the 
government or citizens of at least one other state worldwide (Jones, Bremer, & Singer, 1996). 
The dependent variable equals 1 if in a given year a dyad involves a MID, 0 otherwise. I use 
Zeev Maoz’s (2005) dyadic MID data, which is a refined version of the Correlates of War 
(COW) data on MIDs (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004). Given the dichotomous nature of 
the dependent variable, I use logistic regression (logit) in my estimations. 
Explanatory Variables. 
Economic Development: Economic development is the major component of the 
“capitalist peace”. In measuring the economic development level of a country, I use its real 
gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) measured in purchasing power parities 
(thousands) and constant (1996) dollars. Data availability becomes a serious problem in 
analyzing the economies of developing countries, though. In the most frequently used 
economic dataset Penn World Table (Version 6.1) (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2002), 
economic data are unavailable sporadically for many countries and there is no GDP data at all 
for eleven countries until 1990s. Consequently, about 25% of observations in Penn World 
Table’s GDPpc dataset are missing. However, Gleditsch (2002) introduces some measures to 
reduce the number of missing observations in Penn World Table’s GDP as well as in 
International Monetary Fund’s trade data and manages to have a complete dataset of GDP 
and GDP per capita for years between 1945 and 2000. I follow Dixon’s (1993) “weak link” 
principle, which assumes that the likelihood of conflict is primarily a function of the degree 
of constraints experienced by the less constrained state in each dyad, and consider the level of 
development of the less-developed state for each dyad-year, a variable I call development 
low. To minimize the direction of causality problems, all data on economic development are 
lagged one year.  
Democracy: To determine national levels of democracy and autocracy, I use Polity IV 
(Marshall & Jaggers, 2004) data, which has become the standard for measuring institutional 
democracy, particularly in the study of international conflicts. The Polity IV dataset provides 
an 11-point scale (0-10) of autocracy and an 11-point scale (0-10) of democracy. To 
determine the “net” democracy score of a country, I subtract its autocracy score from its 
democracy score, which yields a range of -10 to 10. I add 11 points to each score and 
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construct a scale of 1-21. I adopt the “weak link” principle in determining the effects of 
regime type on conflict as well and create a democracy low variable. As in the economic 
development variable, all data are lagged by one year.  
Control Variables. 
Capability ratio: To determine the capabilities of each country, I use the Correlates of 
War (COW) data (Singer & Small, 1995), which gauges the National Capabilities of states 
from their population, industry, and military forces. Capability ratio is calculated by taking 
the ratio of the stronger state’s military capability index to that of the weaker member in each 
dyad. A higher score indicates higher power discrepancy, or less power parity, in a dyad. The 
final variable Logcapratio, is the natural log of the capability ratio in a dyad. 
Alliance: The variable alliance equals one if countries A and B are formally allied 
through either a defense pact, entente, or non-aggression pact; it is zero otherwise. I use 
COW’s data on alliances. 
Major power: To control for the higher conflict-proneness of major powers, I use a 
major power variable, which equals 1 if a dyad includes at least one major power and 0 
otherwise. The US, the USSR, Britain, France, and China are considered as major powers for 
the entire period I analyze; Germany and Japan are regarded as major powers after 1989.  
State age (longevity): Several developing countries gained their independence during 
the time period covered by this research. Younger states are expected to focus on state 
building and internal problems and to avoid external conflicts. To control for lower conflict 
propensity in early statehood, I create a state age variable, which equals the number of years 
since independence for each state. As in other variables, I use the state age of the younger 
state in each dyad. The COW’s “state system” data specifies the dates for each state’s entry 
into the international system.   
Developed state: Lastly, to control for the possible distinct relationship between all-
developing-state dyads and the mixed (developing-developed) ones, I include a developed 
state dummy, which equals 1 if a dyad includes a developed state and 0 otherwise. 
--- 
Because my data have a cross-sectional time-series nature, I introduce measures to 
correct or relieve temporal autocorrelation and cross-sectional heterogeneity. Following 
Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s (1998) suggestion to correct temporal dependence and using 
Tucker’s (1999) btscs program, I created a peaceyears variable, which counts the years since 
the last MID, and three cubic splines. Finally, I report robust standard errors clustered on 
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dyad. 
Thus, my final equation on militarized interstate disputes of developing countries is as 
follows: 
MIDij t = a + b1 DEVlowt-1 + b2 DEMlowt-1 + b3 LogCAPRATIOij t + b4 ALLIANCEij t 
+ b5 DEVELOPEDt + b6 MAJORt  + b7 STATE-AGEt + b8 Peaceyearst + b9 Splines  + 
e. 
Results. 
Table 1 displays the results of the logistic regression analysis of the probability of a 
militarized interstate dispute in a developing-state dyad. To start with the control variables, 
all but the developed-state variable have statistically significant effects on the relations within 
a developing-state dyad. Whereas formal dyadic alliances of developing states and increasing 
power discrepancy in a developing-state dyad were found to decrease the likelihood of a 
MID, inclusion of a major power or an older state in a developing-state dyad was found to 
increase the likelihood of a dyadic MID.  
Table I: Logit Estimates of the Probability of a Militarized Interstate Dispute in a Developing-
state Dyad, 1951-2000   
                          
Variables Coefficient Robust SE 
Democracylow -0.0096 0.0113 
Developmentlow -0.0743*** 0.0238 
  
Capability ratio 
(log) 
-0.1597*** 0.0451 
Alliance -0.5023*** 0.1311 
Major Power 0.2940* 0.1677 
Developed 0.0063 0.2019 
State agelow 0.0070*** 0.0015 
Peaceyears -0.1089*** 0.0272 
  
N 12175 
Log likelihood -3108.8653 
Wald chi
2
(11) 552.26 
Prob>chi
2
 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2365 
P-values are based on two-tailed significance test. ***p<0.01;  **p<0.05;  *p<0.10. 
Robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad. Three splines are not reported to save space.  
 
As for the theoretical variables in Table I, development low’s coefficient had a 
negative sign and is significant at 99% significance level (p<.002). However, the effect of 
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democracy low was statistically insignificant even at 90% level. Thus, higher economic 
development is found to decrease the likelihood of a dyadic MID in the developing world, 
whereas democracy’s effect on the same likelihood was insignificant. These findings counter 
the democratic peace argument and support the central argument of the more recent 
“capitalist peace” literature, which contends that it is capitalism, rather than democracy, that 
leads to peace among states.   
Table II displays the substantive effects of development (low), capability ratio, 
alliance, major power, and state age (low) variables on the probability of a dyadic MID in a 
developing-state dyad. An increase from 3,000 dollars (mean value) by a standard deviation 
of 3,150 dollars in the GDPpc of the poorer country in a developing-state dyad decreases the 
likelihood of a MID in that dyad by almost 20%. Graph I below displays the marginal effect 
of economic development (low) in the probability of a MID in a developing-state dyad. The 
likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute, which is almost 7% when the GDPpc of the 
poorer state in the dyad is 1,000 US dollars, declines to below 2% when the GDPpc of the 
poorer state in that dyad reaches to 20,000 US dollars. 
Table II: Changes in the Predicted Probability of a MID in a Developing-state Dyad. 
 
 
 
 
* Changes in predicted probabilities are changes from the base predicted probability of a dyadic militarized 
interstate dispute in Table I (which was 0.06). In this and all other calculations of predicted probabilities, the 
dyad is assumed to be non-allied and include no developed country or major power; all other variables are set at 
their mean values.    
 
As for the control variables, a dyadic alliance reduces the probability of a dyadic MID 
by 38%, whereas major power inclusion increases the same probability by 31.5%. When 
power disparity in a dyad is doubled from its mean value, the probability of a MID in that 
dyad decreases by 25%. Lastly, doubling of the age of the younger state in a dyad from 40 
(mean value) to 80 increases the probability of a dyadic MID by 30%. 
  
Variable Change in p(MID) 
economic development - 19.8 % 
capability ratio - 25 % 
alliance - 38 % 
major power + 31.5 % 
state age + 30 % 
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Graph I: Marginal effect of economic development in the probability of a MID in a developing-
state dyad. 
 
 
Robustness Tests. 
The results of statistical analyses are sensitive to choices regarding variables, sample, and 
measurement. To test the robustness of my findings above, I reran my original model with 
different dependent variables, different measurements of the explanatory variables, and 
within different sub-samples. Table III displays these six replication models. Model 1 in 
Table III is a replication of the original model, which treated the onset and continuation of 
MIDs as the same, with onset MIDs only. Model 2 is a replication with a severer and more 
specific dependent variable: MIDs in which use of force materialized. Not all MIDs have 
equal seriousness and violence. Some remain as mere threats, some include actual use of 
force, and some escalate to full-scale wars. The dependent variable -useforce- equaled 1 if a 
dyad in a given year had a MID in which military force was actually used, and 0 otherwise. 
Model 3 replicates the original model within a sample that includes developing countries 
only. Dyads with a developed country are excluded. Model 4 is a replication of the original 
model within a smaller sample, which excludes dyads that include two of the six Middle 
Eastern oil-rich states, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates. Oil-rich countries are rich but mostly not industrialized and therefore might 
deserve special attention when testing “capitalist peace” arguments. Model 5 is a replication 
with a dichotomous measure of democracy. A group of scholars argue that democracy should 
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be measured dichotomously, rather than continuously (see Elkins (2000) for a discussion of 
continuous vs. dichotomous measures of democracy).
 
 In Model 5, a state is considered a 
democracy if it had a “democracy – autocracy” score of 6 or higher in the original scale (or 
17 or higher in my converted scale). Finally, Model 6 replicates the original model with a 
relative, rather than absolute measure of development. Nominal values of indicators such as 
gross domestic product per capita in time-series settings might be problematic because even 
when using constant dollars we cannot avoid the problem of “rising average”. In measuring 
relative economic development, I accepted the US GDP per capita as baseline (100) and 
compared other states’ development levels with that of the US, i.e. Relative Developmenta = 
(GDPpca/ GDPpcus)*100. 
 
Table III: Replications of the original model. 
    
 
CONFLICT TYPE & SEVERITY SAMPLE MEASUREMENT 
(1) 
 
D.V.:  
Onset only 
(2) 
 
D.V.:  
Use of force 
(3)  
 
NO  
Developed 
(4) 
 
NO  
Oil-rich Dyad 
(5)  
 
Dichotomous 
Democracy 
(6) 
 
Relative 
Development 
 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
       
Democracylow -0.0041 -0.0133 -0.0070 -0.0111 -0.1594 -0.0146 
Developmentlow -0.0517*** -0.1052*** -0.0669*** -0.0656** -0.0745*** -0.0163*** 
       
Capability Ratio 
(log) 
-0.1124*** -0.1474*** -0.1514*** -0.1600*** -0.1619*** -0.1595*** 
Alliance -0.3092*** -0.5841*** -0.4989*** -0.4887*** -0.4979*** -0.4876*** 
Major Power 0.3559** 0.0611 0.2007 0.2948* 0.2992* 0.2760* 
Developed 0.1670 0.1430  -0.0164 0.0066 0.0388 
State Agelow 0.0063*** 0.0067*** 0.0069*** 0.0068*** 0.0069*** 0.0070*** 
Peaceyears -0.0484*** -0.1122*** -0.1077*** -0.1084*** -0.1091*** -0.1081*** 
       
N 12175 12175 10991 11933 12175 12175 
Log likelihood -2698.4385 -2651.4177 -2806.9213 -3091.1491 -3109.0604 -3108.604 
Wald chi
2
(11) 476.72 508.40 462.39 554.40 561.21 552.46 
Prob>chi
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1289 0.2331 0.2312 0.2346 0.2365 0.2366 
P-values are based on two-tailed significance test.  ***p<0.01;  **p<0.05;  *p<0.10. 
Robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad. Three splines are not reported to save space.  
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The results did not show any substantial change in any replication model so far as the 
two explanatory variables are concerned. The signs and the statistical significance (or lack 
thereof) of the development (low) and democracy (low) variables remained the same in all six 
models in Table III. Development (low)’s effect on the likelihood of conflict was always 
negative and statistically significant in all models; whereas that of democracy (low) never 
achieved statistical significance even at 90% level. Thus, the earlier findings in Table I are 
found to be robust. Within the developing world, economic development leads to interstate 
peace, democracy does not. 
Concluding Remarks 
Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence which indicate two 
different dynamics of interstate conflict in the developing and the developed worlds, the 
proponents of both “democratic peace” and “capitalist peace” arguments did not take into 
account the distinction between developing and developed countries and tested their 
hypotheses within samples that included “all dyads” in different time periods. This study 
aimed to fill this gap by testing capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the 
developing world. 
My empirical results provided support to the “capitalist peace” argument and 
countered the “democratic peace” argument. Economic development was found have a 
negative, substantial, and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of dyadic MID in 
the developing world. By contrast, democracy’s effect on the likelihood of dyadic MID never 
achieved statistical significance even at 90% significance level. These findings were robust to 
different measures of conflict, democracy and economic development. Thus, within the 
developing world, it seems economic development leads to interstate peace, whereas 
democracy does not. This result suggests that, in the developing world, economic 
development is not just an issue of economic or humanitarian concern, but also a fundamental 
security issue. To achieve sustainable global peace, policies that would foster economic 
development in the developing world ought to be encouraged and supported. 
This finding counters the “law-like status” argument for democratic peace (Levy, 
1994) and supports the earlier research which suggested that the peaceful effect of democracy 
is limited to Western Europe and North America (Goldstein, 2006; Henderson, 2003). As 
such, what has so far been theorized as “democratic peace” might actually be “developed 
democratic peace.” Thus, current overly-confident expectations about the peaceful 
consequences of democratization in the developing world should be re-evaluated. 
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Democratization in the developing world does not seem to bring international peace unless it 
is coupled with economic development. 
A major implication of this study for future research is that there seems to be some 
qualitative differences between developing countries and the developed ones and it seems 
these differences matter so far as involvement in militarized interstate disputes are concerned. 
There is no reason to not expect that the qualitative differences between the developing and 
the developed world would be relevant to other research programs in the field of international 
conflicts, such as the purported peaceful effects of international trade or international 
organizations. Scholars of international conflict are advised to be more cautious in pooling all 
dyads and making universal claims. 
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